TR-076, The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis, February 16, 1993, a compilation of 24-plus articles on this incident originally published in Fire Engineering, December 1993* United States Fire Administration Technical Report Series The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis Provided by Fire Engineering Federal Emergency Management Agency United States Fire Administration National Fire Data Center United States Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program The United States Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant "lessons learned." In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire --the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at national and regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters. This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas. Under unusual circumstances the Fire Administration is sometimes not able to conduct an investigation after a major fire. Such was the case with the tragic, massive emergency of the World Trade Center explosion and subsequent fire and evacuation in New York City in February of 1993 because of the criminal investigation following the incident and involvement of other federal as well as state and local agencies in that investigation. Fortunately Fire Engineering magazine subsequently published an entire issue containing over 24 articles describing all the major aspects of the incident, fire and EMS operations, building construction features, lessons learned in each area, and actions that have been taken to improve the facility since the incident. The Fire Administration requested permission from Fire Engineering's Editor William A. Manning to publish the entire issue, which is how this report came about. Only a few of the photographs from the original issue of Fire Engineering were used here; their selection was based on suitability for the Xerox-type reproduction used for FEMA/ USFA publications. The United States Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the Fire Engineering organization and staff and all of the authors and organizations who supplied materials and agreed to their use for this purpose. The Fire Department of the City of New York has also prepared and published an extensive after-action report which was published in WNYF (With New York Firefighters), Volume 54, Number 3, which the interested reader will wish to obtain. For copies contact editor Gloria Sturzenacker, WNYF Subscription Department, FDNY Fire Academy, Randall's Island, NY 10035 ($ 4.00 back issue price). For additional copies of this report write to the United States Fire Administration, Fire Management Programs, 16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis Provided by Fire Engineering William A. Manning, Editor This is Report 076 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-4-4329 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Federal Emergency Management Agency United States Fire Administration National Fire Data Center CONTENTS Report from Chief of Department by Anthony L. Fusco . . . 1 Complex Overview by Port Authority Risk Management Staff . . . .. . 22 Blast Damage by Steven C. De Rosa . . 24 The Materials Involved in the WTC Bomb, by Frank L. Fire . . . . . 26 Control of Elevator Operations by Steven C. DeRosa . .27 First Response: Engine 6 Operations Below Grade by Timothy F. Dowling . .. 31 Rapid Intervention at the Vista Hotel, Above Grade by John J. Walpole . . . . 38 Below-Grade Fire Extinguishment and Victim Recovery by Kenneth Cerreta . .. . 42 Operations in Tower 1 by Donald J. Bums . . . . 49 Operations in Tower 2 by Robert Manson . . . 57 Search and Rescue: An Overview by Ray Downey . . . . . . 63 At the Bottom of the Crater by Kevin Shea . . . . . . 67 The Rescue of Firefighter Kevin Shea bysteven C. De Rosa . .70 Above-Grade Tactics and Procedures for Search, Rescue, and Evacuation, by John P. O'Connell . .. . 73 Search Tactics and Procedures Below Grade by John P. O'Connell . . 80 The Thermal Imaging Camera by John P. O'Connell . . 84 The Search Camera by John P. O'Connell . .. .85 Response by Manhattan Dispatchers by Herb Eysser . . .. . .87 EMS Response to the Explosion by Zachary Goldfarb and Steven Kuhr . . . . 92 Forward Triage on the 34th Floor byJackJ. Murphy, Jr., andJackJ. Delaney . .. . .111 Experiences of the Chief Engineer of the Port Authority by Eugene Fasullo . . . . 115 The World Trade Center Complex by the Port Authority Risk Management Staff . . . . 118 Fire Prevention and Building Restoration Activities by Dave Corcoran . .. . . 132 The WTC and National Codes by Glenn P. Corbett . . . 141 Evacuating People with Disabilities by Edwina Juillet . . . . . 143 Vulnerability of Buildings to Blast Damage and Blast-Induced Fire Damage, by Ronald J. Massa . .. . 148 Protecting Buildings Against Terrorism byEve Hinman Matthys P. Levy . . .. . 151 Appendix A: Photographs . . . . . . . 155 Report from Chief of Department by Anthony L. Fusco The City of New York Fire Department has responded hundreds of times to the World Trade Center (WTC) since it was first occupied in 1970. These responses normally consist of minor fires or false alarms but have included major fires such as the one that occurred on February 13, 1975. None of these experiences could have prepared us for what was to occur on February %, 1993. The bombing of the WTC was an event of immense proportions, the largest incident ever handled in the City of New York Fire Department's 128-year history also complex that it was effectively several major multiple-alarm fires combined into one. In terms of the number of fire department units that responded, it was the equivalent of a 16-alarm fire. As the incident commander, I can attest to the fact that it was the firefighters' tremendous efforts and courage that brought this incident to a successful conclusion. The statistics are staggering: Six people died and 1,042 were injured. Of those injured, 15 received traumatic injuries from the blast itself. Nearly 20 people complained of cardiac problems, and nearly 30 pregnant women were rescued. Eighty-eight firefighters (one requiring hospitalization), 35 police officers, and one EMS worker sustained injuries. It is estimated that approximately 50,000 people were evacuated from the WTC complex, including nearly 25,000 from each of the two towers. Fire alarm dispatchers received more than 1,000 phone calls, most reporting victims trapped on the upper floors of the towers. Search and evacuation of the towers finally were completed some 11 hours after the incident began. A nitrourea bomb, in excess of 1,000 pounds, with hydrogen cylinders to add impact, was detonated in the now-infamous yellow Ryder Econoline van on the B-2 level of the parking garage, causing massive destruction that spanned seven levels, six below grade. The L-shaped blast crater on B-2 at its maximum measured 130 feet wide by 150 feet long. The blast's epicenter was under the northeast corner of the Vista Hotel. Anthony L Fusco is chief of department and a 33-year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department. He served as the incident commander for the World Trade Center incident. Page 1 FDNY ultimately responded to the incident with 84 engine companies, 60 truck companies, 28 battalion chiefs, nine deputy chiefs, and five rescue companies and 26 other special units (representing nearly 45 percent of the on-duty staff of FDNY). The fire department units maintained a presence at the scene for 28 days. FEBRUARY 26, 1993 Snow was falling in lower Manhattan during the noon lunch hour on February 26. Temperatures hovered in the mid-20s. At 1218 hours, an explosion rocked the WTC complex. Members of Engine Co. 10 and Ladder Co. 10, located in a firehouse directly across from the WTC complex on Liberty Street, felt the rumble of the blast. They responded from quarters on a "verbal" alarm, notifying FDNY Manhattan dispatchers of the incident and their response. Simultaneously, Manhattan dispatchers received a flood of calls into their office. From initial indications, it was thought that a transformer had exploded in the vicinity of the Vista Hotel; however, from the number of phone calls received and initial reports from arriving units, the "normal" assignment response of two engines, two trucks, and a battalion chief was filled out, sending an additional engine company and Rescue Company 1 to Box 69. First-arriving Engine Co. 10 and Ladder Co. 10 were met with the classic signs of a below-grade transformer explosion -heavy black smoke rolling from the WTC basement through its garage doors at their location on the West Street side of the building. [See following page for diagram of World Trade Center Complex.] One thing caught their attention, however -the basement garage doors were buckled. The lieutenant of Ladder 10 ordered the buckled garage doors to be opened with power saws for access and better ventilation. With an apparent working fire in progress, Engine 10 transmitted the 10-75 signal (a working fire). This signal initiated the response of an additional battalion chief, the 2nd Battalion, as well as the deputy chief of the 1st Division. Under normal standard operating procedures, first-arriving units proceed to the Port Authority (PA) Police station/ fire command station on the B-l level to determine the location of the fire. But because of the damage, this could not be done. In addition, Engine l0/ Ladder 10 and the 1st Battalion are equipped with transmitting radios set to Port Authority Page 2 World Trade Center Complex 1 World Trade Center -11O-story office tower 772-2-28-94-3 2 World Trade Center -110-story office tower 3 World Trade Center -22-story Vista Hotel 4 World Trade Center -9-story offlce building 5 World Trade Center -9-story office building 6 World Trade Center -8-story Customs House 7 World Trade Center -47-story office building Police frequencies. Members entered the building through the garage ramps: They encountered people who were evacuating, several of whom were injured. Once inside, they immediately knew this was not a transformer fire-the damage was too great. A major explosion had occurred in the garage. Chief John Casey of the 1st Battalion also was becoming aware that this was not a transformer problem. The PA Police radio in his vehicle Page 3 was reporting an explosion, and Engine 10 confirmed this by reporting heavy damage in the garage. Upon arrival, he noted the heavy smoke issuing from the garage level and immediately transmitted the l0-76 signal (a working high-rise fire) at 12: 24 p. m. This brought one additional engine company, two additional ladder companies, Rescue Co. 3, the Field Communications Unit (FieldCorn), the Mask Service Unit (MSU), and Engine Co. 3 as the High-Rise Unit. Haz Mat 1 also responded. Two additional boxes (9031 and 9032) were transmitted in conjunction with the l0-76 signal to bring additional units to the scene because of potential (yet typical) traffic problems during the daytime. These units came from Brooklyn, bringing an additional engine, truck, and battalion chief through the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and another engine, truck, and battalion chief over the Manhattan Bridge. >From all indications, the explosion and resultant fire appeared to be located under the Vista Hotel. Chief Casey assumed command and established his command post in front of the hotel on West Street. Almost immediately after his arrival, he received reports that the Tower 1 lobby was filling with smoke and that people here trapped below grade. He transmitted a second alarm for Box 69 at 12: 27 p. m. (due to problems developing in the Vista Hotel) and a third alarm for Box 69 (problems developing in Tower 1) at 12: 30 p. m. FDNY has assigned specific box numbers for specific significant buildings. In the case of the WTC, Box 8084 is assigned to Tower 1 and Box 8087 to Tower 2. Since this incident originated at the Vista Hotel, the street box was transmitted initially. As the incident grew and it became apparent that the towers were involved, the specific 8084 and 8087 boxes were transmitted. Dispatchers at the Manhattan Dispatchers Office began to receive a flood of calls regarding smoke problems and trapped people in Tower 1. Therefore, they transmitted an initial alarm for Box 8084 at 12: 29 p. m. Deputy Chief Robert Beier arrived and attempted to gain access to the fire command station on the B-l level. Besides finding the garage full of smoke, Beier was told by PA Police that the fire command station had been badly damaged. Minute by minute, the incident escalated exponentially. He transmitted a fourth alarm for Box 69 at 12: 37 p. m., realizing that a large portion of the WTC complex was involved in the incident. Beier was now receiving a constant stream of reports of trapped people in Tower 1. He dispatched companies to Tower 1 and the below-grade areas as soon as they arrived, attempting to ration them evenly. A second alarm for Box 8084 was transmitted at 12: 39 p. m. by Page 4 Deputy Assistant Chief Kenneth Cerreta, the Manhattan south commander, who arrived shortly after Deputy Chief Beier and assumed command. My pager began beeping incessantly for each additional alarm--this was "The Big One." I responded from headquarters in Brooklyn, as did several other staff officers. By now, the battalion and deputy chiefs at the scene began to comprehend the magnitude of the incident. A major fire was burning below grade. People were injured and trapped by the explosion. Communications were lost in the WTC complex Smoke was contaminating Tower 1 and the Vista Hotel. A major extinguishment and rescue scenario was unfolding. [See building diagram including below-grade levels on following page.] Deputy Assistant Chief Cerreta was receiving numerous reports of smoke problems in Tower 1 and dispatched a fire company to investigate this specific problem. They reported a heavy smoke condition in the lobby and contamination of vertical shafts, including the stairways and elevators. Occupants were self-evacuating, and some were breaking windows on the upper floors. Assistant Chief Donald Burns, chief of operations, arrived shortly after from Fire Department Headquarters and went directly to Tower 1, establishing a sector command post at that location. I arrived at the command post at 12: 48 hours. I could see smoke pouring out of the parking garage doors of the Vista Hotel. I also noted that the lobby windows of Tower 1 were blackened with smoke. Cerreta briefed me on what information was known. He, Beier, and I discussed their size-up. Reports of a transformer explosion had been given over the department radio, but this had not yet been confirmed. The only known facts were that an explosion had occurred, people were injured, fire was burning on a lower level (or levels), and voluminous amounts of smoke were being produced, with three very large buildings affected. Deputy Chief Steven De Rosa of the 3rd Division had been directed to establish sector command of the Vista Hotel -I was concerned about the life hazard directly above the explosion/ fire area. After my own quick size-up, I asked Deputy Assistant Chief Cerreta if he could try to determine the extent of the operation, exactly what was burning, and what had occurred; he left the command post with that mission. Very shortly thereafter, Chief Burns reported to me that huge volumes of smoke were entering Tower 1 and that he believed the wall or Page 5 Blast Damage partition separating this tower from the fire area was blown out and the smoke movement could not be stopped. It was readily apparent, even at this early stage, that a major commitment of personnel would be required. I transmitted a fifth alarm for Box 69 at 12: 54 p. m. I contacted Chief Cerreta and directed him to abandon his reconnaissance mission and take command of fire extinguishment operations below grade. It was very clear to me that without the ability to control the smoke, the fire had to be extinguished as quickly as possible. Fire extinguishment would be the key to stabilizing the incident and protecting lives in the buildings above. As units arrived in response to the additional alarms, they were dispatched to sectors needing additional help. A FIREFIGHTER MISSING At about the same time that Chief Burns advised me of the missing wall in the Vista Hotel, Assistant Chief Ralph Palmer, who with Assistant Chief Eugene Dockter had assumed command of the Vista Hotel sector, reported that a firefighter was missing. It was believed that he had fallen in a large hole (this turned out to be the explosion crater). This became a primary concern. Deputy Chief De Rosa, Battalion Chief Richard Rewkowski, Squad One, one rescue company, two ladder companies, and three engine companies ultimately were devoted to this operation. Later, it was determined that Firefighter Kevin Shea of Rescue 1, attempting to reach a trapped victim, had fallen into the crater. He would require major surgery that very day to treat his injuries. The command post was now receiving reports of smoke in Tower 2 and that people were self-evacuating and were trapped in elevators. Deputy Chief Robert Manson and Deputy Chief Joseph Mills established sector command at Tower 2. INCIDENT COMMAND With Tower 2 command established, the framework for command and control was in place: The situation was divided into three primary sectors-Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel, and two subsectors-Firefighter Shea rescue and below grade extinguishment and search. Later, additional sectors would be established to ensure search of all complex buildings and the concourse area. The sector commanders, in effect, ran their own operations. These chiefs split up their areas of responsibility into manageable parts so that Page 7 subsectors and sub-subsectors were controlled by chief officers. Each sector reported its progress, problems, and needs to the command post, and the command post would provide necessary personnel and equipment, develop strategy, and implement same through sector commands. In this way, we attempted to operate with reasonable assurance that personnel accountability and safety, as well as fulfillment of operational needs, could be achieved while command strategy was implemented. >From my perspective as incident commander, keeping track of units and status was a major undertaking. I utilized the FieldCorn Unit's command board to record unit positions. Two chiefs and the officer of the FieldCorn Unit assisted in this effort. Members of the FieldCorn Unit established field headquarters, monitored radio and portable radio communications, transmitted progress reports, and maintained a logistics board. Logistics and staging were huge undertakings, and First Deputy Commissioner (now Acting Commissioner) William Feehan directed logistics while Deputy Assistant Chief Donald Ruland handled staging for the incredible number of units already on the scene and still arriving. I assigned Deputy Assistant Chief Elsworth Hughes as liaison officer. The command post was congested with representatives from many different agencies, including the city's Office of Emergency Management (the citywide disaster task force); PA Police; New York Police Department; New York City EMS; PA management, engineering, and risk management; Consolidated Edison (Con Ed, a local power utility); the Department of Environmental Protection; and many others. Fire department members in many cases worked closely with personnel from other agencies. For example, they worked with the local power utility to conduct gas shutoffs; worked with the Interstate Transportation Department to survey PATH train tracks on B 6; worked with various agencies to establish policy and procedures for potential asbestos release; and, most notably, worked with police and EMS personnel to effect safe rescues and give medical treatment. With a constant barrage of people trying to gain access to our command post and the snowy weather conditions, it was decided that a more secure location was needed. A large tent was obtained and set up, and the command post was moved there. This tent provided shelter as well as isolation of the command post. A major detriment to our ability to strengthen control of the incident was fire department on-scene communications. Communications were a serious problem from the outset. With 156 units and 31 chiefs operating at the height of this incident, try to imagine how difficult it was Page 8 Typical Sector Command Post -FDNY Significant Aspects of Command Structure to gain control of the portable-radio operations frequency. Two command channels and one tactical channel were used. In many cases, runners were sent by a sector commander to communicate with the incident commander. Generally, the problems were caused by one or more of the following factors: the number of resources using channels; not enough channels for operational areas; distance problems -lost messages; construction of building interrupted signals; and the inability to contact other agencies. Fireground communications have become a major concern of FDNY, and several initiatives are underway to enhance communications. Many workers in the twin towers had access to operating telephones. More than 1,000 calls would be made to 911 (an office within the police department communications center that routes fire calls to the fire department) or the FDNY Manhattan Dispatchers Office. In fact, calls were received by the four other boroughs' dispatch offices as well as fire department headquarters in Brooklyn. As we received these distress calls through the FieldCom Unit, they were passed to the command post. Every call had to be acted on. I and my staff at the command post determined how to prioritize the calls based on emergency/ severity and available resources. THE PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER While I worked to establish command and control, reports from sector commanders started to fill out the entire picture, and I began to realize the full magnitude of the incident. Within a short time I knew that the complex's fire alarm and public address systems were out of service; the PA Police Department fire command station was out of service; the complex's standpipe systems was damaged due to destroyed piping on the lower levels but was effective in some areas for some units; Page 11 the automatic sprinkler system was out of service in the area of the explosion and fire; significant portions of the electric power to Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel were out of service; emergency generators, located in the B-6 level, had their domestic water cooling lines broken by the blast. They ran for 20 minutes, then shut down because of overheating; a plaster ceiling of the PATH train station on the B-5 level had collapsed due to the explosion; smoke was moving into many areas of the Vista Hotel, Tower 1, and Tower 2; rescuers were removing numerous injured from both above and below in the complex; a major evacuation had to be accomplished -once 50,000 people decided to self- evacuate, there was no turning back, not without a working communication system; and the potential number of people trapped in elevators was great, and my suspicion was substantiated by the number of elevator rescues that already had been achieved. Armed with this information, I expanded our response to fill growing strategic needs. I transmitted a simultaneous third alarm, calling 40 additional engine and ladder companies from Brooklyn, a "borough call." This was done to avoid stripping Manhattan of units and also was a quick way of dispatching a large number of units to a location. Over the course of the next few hours, several additional alarms and special calls would be transmitted to meet the ever- increasing demand for manpower. No mutual aid was requested or called for by FDNY. Some New Jersey as well as upstate New York units responded with equipment and assistance, but they did this on their own and were not utilized by the fire department. Page 12 OPERATIONS Within one hour of my arrival on the scene, the rescue of Firefighter Shea was completed and the fires in the below-grade area were being brought under control. Our focus narrowed to primary search of the below-grade levels (we had reports of still-missing occupants); primary search and evacuation of the towers and the hotel; and an assessment of the damage and stability of the below-grade areas, such as it would impact the safety of personnel still operating there. Damage/ hazard assessment. Lights were brought into the below-grade areas. Damage from the blast was extensive. The B-2 level surrounding ground zero was completely destroyed. Piping and conduit were snapped like twigs. Masonry walls and steel-reinforced concrete flooring were blown apart. Cars were strewn about like toys. Steel columns were shocked but held. A chief was directed to secure and define the stability of the collapse area. He was to accomplish the assessment with Port Authority engineers. The explosion severed four of the even operating electrical feeders. This had the effect of disrupting all fire protection systems and also causing sporadic power loss throughout the complex. For reasons too numerous to mention, power shutoff by the FDNY command post was never requested. All train traffic in the area vas stopped, and the gas to the complex was shut down. Members were advised to operate cautiously at all below-grade areas. For reasons unknown to me, power was completely removed from the complex at around 1: 30 p. m. It was determined that operations below grade could continue within reasonable safety limits, but the potential for secondary collapse was ever present. Below grade. With such extensive damage to the below-grade levels-debris was piled several feet high about the blast area-primary and secondary searches were very difficult and dangerous. Chief Cerreta supervised the search effort. Searches were conducted under the protection of charged hoselines. Port Authority personnel assisted by establishing a probable victim location in occupied work areas on the B-2 level under the Vista Hotel and Tower 1. The blast destroyed a dividing wall between the garage and this work area (demolished, it was later found, by a steel support beam hurled through it with the unimaginable force created by the blast). A search first Page 13 was concentrated in this area, and four fatalities were located and removed by FDNY to a temporary morgue established in the Vista Hotel. Five of the six fatalities in this incident were removed within the first two hours. (One victim was found by FDNY on a driveway ramp early in the incident.) The sixth victim was located in rubble by police personnel during their investigation 17 days later. Members removed 16 civilians trapped under the debris in a locker room near the epicenter of the blast; located and rescued civilians from a demolished room suspended precariously over the crater; rescued victims who fell into the crater; and conducted very thorough, exhausting primary and secondary searches of the blast area, removing scores of injured. In total, 71 companies were utilized for extinguishment, rescue, primary and secondary searches, recoveries, and logistics support on the below-grade levels. Above grade. The large quantities of smoke that had been generated prior to the fire's knockdown became a major operational factor. Due to the destroyed elevator shaft doors at the B-2 level, the hole in the Vista Hotel meeting room with the blown-out glass partition wall between the Vista Hotel and Tower 1, and doors being opened on all floors by people evacuating -and with the stack effect working -most floors and all stairways of Tower 1 and the Vista Hotel became charged with smoke. Tower 2 had a smoke condition but to a lesser degree. The smoke condition in Tower 1 was the worst of the three buildings above grade. The initial commitment of above-grade resources was devoted to the Vista Hotel. This 22-story hotel, in and of itself, would under normal firefighting operations be a major undertaking. At this incident, it would be handled in a most expedient manner (assisted by the time of day when many people had checked out and others had yet to check in) by the building's fire safety directors and our firefighters and fire officers. The building was searched within approximately one hour. Units were directed from the Vista Hotel sector to assist in Tower 1 and Tower 2. Search and evacuation of the towers became the greatest challenges. Stairways were massively congested. Many occupants could not make the descent under their own power. Pregnant women, older people, people with heart conditions, and people with physical disabilities all required fire department assistance. Firefighters carried people down the stairs some 60 floors or more via stokes baskets, stair chairs, wheelchairs, and office chairs. Groups of children had to be escorted to street level -one group Page 14 of children from the 92nd floor. Resuscitators and first aid were required for many occupants. Primary and secondary searches of every floor, each 40,000 square feet, were required. Forcible entry was performed to gain entry onto floors and office spaces. Adding to our difficulties was a reported "bomb scare" on the 65th floor of Tower 1, for which firefighters stretched a line off the standpipe and supported police efforts. As challenging as stairway evacuation and floor search were, the most difficult part of this operation from the standpoint of strategy and tactics was locating and searching the 99 elevators in each of the towers and the 12 in the Vista Hotel. Many elevators were in blind shafts and between floors. Identification of car location was difficult and time-consuming. Many walls had to be breached to gain entry into elevator cars. Literally hundreds of people were trapped in elevators when the power went down. In one case, 10 elevator occupants in Tower 1 were found unconscious, lying on the car floor -they were resuscitated and safely turned over to EMS personnel. In another case, 72 schoolchildren in Tower 2 were rescued from a car stuck in a blind shaft. Once outside the building, victims had to contend with falling glass broken by a few occupants on upper floors. This was a real problem over which the fire department had no control. Some of this glass breaking was due to erroneous information disseminated by the media, encouraging people in the towers to take such action. An unusual aspect of this incident was that a large elevator company has offices within the WTC towers. This company had several maintenance technicians working within the building at the time of the explosion. Knowing that people were trapped in the elevators, these technicians early in the incident began the process of manually moving the stalled cabs to the tower lobbies, but not all of their well-intentioned efforts were communicated to FDNY, at least initially. Had better interagency communications existed, elevator searches could have been better coordinated with the fire department. More than eight million square feet of space were searched in Tower 1, Tower 2, and the Vista Hotel. Tower 1 required the largest commitment of above-grade resources. When other sectors began reducing units, they were told to report to the command post. We would reassign them as necessary unless the members were fatigued, in which case they would be relieved. During the entire course of the incident, 55 companies operated in Tower 1, 27 in Tower 2, and 20 in the Vista Hotel. Page 15 Operations continued well into the night. At 11: 45 p. m., the last elevator was located and the people removed. They had been in the elevator for more than 11 hours. Change of tour relief would be handled by the transmission of additional alarms. Some members, due to the fact that they had climbed to the upper floors of the towers, could not be relieved. It took hours to reach the upper floors of the two 110-story buildings, and of necessity, these members would keep working until they could make their way down the buildings, performing secondary searches as they did so. POWER RESTORATION Power restoration was critical, not only for the trapped occupants and firefighters but for other reasons as well. The New York Telephone Company had a major telephone exchange at the WTC complex. Besides providing telephone service to a portion of Manhattan, it also provided service for the air traffic control of the three major regional airports. This telephone equipment had emergency generator backup, but the generator cooling lines had also been compromised by the blast, as had the PA's generators for the WTC complex. Fortunately, battery backup was also provided and kept the telephone system running until power could be restored. Power began to be restored around 6 p. m. and continued until midnight, when most of the branch circuits in Towers 1 and 2 had been restored. Power restoration concentrated on the elevator banks first, with other sections of the buildings following. THE MORNING AFTER FDNY met with high-level PA officials at the WTC early Monday morning after the blast. FDNY advised them and assisted them on the restoration of fire protection systems (standpipes, sprinklers, etc.). We had engine companies hooked up to fire department connections, ready to supply the system if needed. Our assistance also included establishing what minimum level of protection would be needed before reoccupancy was permitted. Our fire prevention bureau worked very closely with the PA to get the buildings "back on line" as soon as possible. We would maintain a presence at the scene until March 25, 1993. Page 16 LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED 1. As many incidents throughout history have shown, fire extinguishment is the most effective weapon against smoke generation and, therefore. smoke migration. The decision to attack the basement fires in the initial stages of the incident was the most important decision of the incident in that hundreds maybe thousands of lives were saved due to timely extinguishment of the fires. Stretching handlines into the below-grade garage areas of a large public building after a bomb explosion is a challenge for firefighters. Traditional water sources may not be available or used to capacity (FDNY staged a marine unit to draft out of the Hudson River and supply engine companies, had it been necessary); standpipes may be damaged. Quick and easy routes to the seat of the fire will not be available. Units may have to knock down numerous fires (such as fires in individual burning vehicles) before they reach their objective. The volume of fire (depending on the combustibles in the explosion space) and the need to protect engine companies from possible fire dangers (such as ruptured gas tanks, secondary collapse and fire, etc.) dictate the use of handlines that can produce flows greater than 200 gpm. 2. This was the largest building evacuation ever recorded. The "defend-in-place" strategy did not exist. Building evacuation and human behavior in this incident will be studied for years to come, hopefully yielding new lessons appropriate for inclusion in building codes. 3. This incident exemplifies the classic high-rise stack effect -vertical upward movement of smoke and heated gases due to the cold temperatures outside and warm temperatures inside. Upward smoke movement was enhanced by the breaching of the Vista Hotel meeting room floor/ glass wall as well as breaches in the bottom of elevator and stair shafts. The force of the bomb itself also helped to propel the smoke upward. Finally, people opening doors in stair shafts allowed smoke to migrate from floor to stair shaft or vice versa. 4. The WTC is a well-constructed complex. In spite of major damage, it withstood the effects of a terrorist bomb. At the time of the explosion, it exceeded some local building and Page 17 fire code requirements but did not comply with others. An effort should be made through legislation to enforce all local codes in all structures. If the fire department is to fight the fire, the fire department should enforce the codes. This will improve and allow for knowledge and standardization of fire protection features. WTC management was very cooperative in working with FDNY and other agencies following the explosion and has made numerous enhancements so that code compliance has been achieved and, in some cases, exceeded. Enhancements include changes in the number of fire command stations and in the organization and training of fire safety personnel within the complex; communications upgrades, particularly a backup wireless communications system and tertiary, battery- powered emergency stairway and elevator lighting; enhanced provisions for smoke evacuation from stairways and elevators; a better means for determining the location of elevators in blind shafts; methods to prevent interruption of emergency generator power; and many others. The importance of being able to communicate with building occupants cannot be over stressed. Many of the evacuation problems that existed at this incident would have been greatly reduced had some form of communication been available. 5. Fire department communications were severely stressed at this oneration. Department communications capabilities must be established so that they can handle the largest of emergencies that could occur in the jurisdiction. Our standard portable radio tactical frequency was overloaded and ineffective. The same problems were encountered with the command channels. A trunked 800 MHz system would have achieved much better results; FDNY currently is in the process of developing such a system. In addition, equipping division and battalion chiefs with cellular telephones would have made it possible to communicate with units operating on upper floors. The FDNY incident command system depends largely on its FieldCorn Unit. This unit is expected to transmit and receive critical information on the fireground. In the WTC incident, this unit experienced an overload situation. The importance of this unit requires that it be amply staffed with highly trained and experienced officers and personnel. We must continually seek improvements to our equipment. A specific tone alert for portable radios signaling all radio transmissions to Page 18 cease would be invaluable, allowing a commander or member to gain control of the network and transmit a mayday or urgent message. Human message relays were an important method of communication at this incident. 6. Controlling a large-scale incident is beyond the canabilities of any one individual. The incident command system must be utilized and expanded to ensure adequate span of control and personnel accountability/ safety. The system must be flexible and adaptable. The incident command system was expanded in proportion to the size of the incident. The incident commander must take steps to manage the large-scale incident through well-positioned sector and subsector officers. The incident commander at a major incident has a dual problem: information overload -too much information coming in and very little or not enough time to evaluate and act in a timely fashion -and too many chiefs and officials demanding attention. People will get frustrated when they feel they have important information that is not acted on immediately. This can be overcome by assigning an additional staff chief of appropriate rank to assist the incident commander. This chief should accept the reports and make the IC aware of them in a timely fashion and in priority order. Another position should be created to handle agencies that will report to the command post offering assistance, be it information, equipment, or other resources -and there were many such offers at the WTC incident. A high-ranking officer should be stationed at the command post to record all this information and develop a system whereby these parties could be recalled at the appropriate time. People came to the command post with generators, pumps, and offers of expert help in one trade or another, but when the time came that we could have utilized that assistance often they had left the area and could not be found. The portable command post (PCP) given to each division is an excellent control tool for a sector commander. However, lack of highly visible incident command post facilities proved to be a disadvantage at this incident. The fire department is currently pursuing more "operational friendly," visible command equipment that will be the focal point for other agencies at operations where the fire department is the lead agency/ incident commander. Page 19 7. The fire department does not operate in a vacuum. Assistance from and interaction with other agencies are essential. Gaining and maintaining cooperation from and coordination with other agencies can be a problem; in this incident, interagency protocols were violated on several occasions. For example, during this incident, it had been reported that several people were trapped on the Tower 2 roof. A few members of the police department stepped outside the protocol of the ICS and conducted an operation to remove these people via helicopter. To be effective, interagency protocols require routine drills. During drills, friendships will be established and maintained, and a deeper understanding of the other agencies' roles will lead to better interaction during agencies. A better understanding of the incident command system is required by all city emergency responders. With thorough knowledge of the benefits of the ICS, there will be less reluctance on the part of all agencies to use it. 8. Firefighter rest and rehabilitation will be difficult to achieve in onerations in which it can take as long as three or four hours to reach an objective. Make every effort to establish "R & R posts" at key points throughout large buildings. 9. Elevator search and rescue was a major challenge in this incident. Many elevators were stuck in blind shafts when the power went down, and elevator recall to the sky lobbies (the transfer floors for other elevators serving upper floors) was a slow process. Identification of elevator car locations in the blind shafts was especially difficult in Tower 1 because the shafts were charged with smoke. Several lessons were learned with respect to elevator search, including: -Elevators on floors with public assembly areas (observation deck, restaurants, etc.) should be a search and evacuation priority. They may have heavy occupancy; in one case, for example, 72 schoolchildren and teachers were stuck in one elevator. -An elevator liaison officer should be designated for coordinating/ controlling elevator companies. -Coordination with elevator personnel is essential. Interagency pre-planning with respect to elevator control is called for. Page 20 10. A public information officer is essential. The fire department must ensure that TV and radio reports are accurate, especially for people on the upper floors of high-rise buildings who are taking their cues from these reports. Many so-called "experts" on high-rise fire operations, safety, evacuation procedures, etc. were sought by the media, and some of these individuals supplied erroneous information that could have resulted in further operational problems. One noted TV personality encouraged occupants to vent the tower windows by breaking glass; one willing viewer, it has been reported, obliged by throwing a fax machine out the window. The primary thrust of the public information officer is to present factual information and messages to the media on a timely basis, but this officer also serves to demonstrate to the public that its lead agency in a fire/ rescue emergency has the knowledge, ability, and resources to control the situation. As it was, the fire department put itself in a "react" mode concerning media communications. 11. A major disaster committee or task force should be developed to hold hearings and investigate all facets of a major incident to determine the impact on fire department onerations. The task force should include members from operations, fire prevention, support services, communications, the legal division, and any others deemed appropriate by the fire commissioner. Page 21 Complex Overview by Port Authority Risk Management Staff The World Trade Center (WTC) is owned and operated by the Port Authority (PA) of New York and New Jersey. It was developed and constructed by the PA to serve as the headquarters for international trade within the New York, New Jersey region. The WTC is located on a 16-acre site in lower Manhattan. The complex consists of two 110-story office towers (1 and 2 WTC), a 22-story luxury hotel (3 WTC), two nine-story office buildings (4 and 5 WTC), an eight-story U. S. Customs House (6 WTC), and a 47-story office building (7 WTC). All seven buildings exit onto a five-acre plaza as well as onto the surrounding city streets. The complex is bound by West Street to the west, Vesey and Barclay streets to the north, Church Street to the east, and Liberty Street to the south. The mall at the WTC, located directly below the plaza, is the largest enclosed shopping mall in lower Manhattan, as well as the main interior pedestrian circulation level for the complex. The WTC complex contains more than 12 million square feet of rentable office space. Each of the 110 floors is approximately one acre (40,000 square feet) in size and is not obstructed by columns, to allow maximum flexibility in office layouts. Tower 1 (North Tower) is 1,368 feet tall and has a 351-foot commercial television antenna mast mounted on top. Tower 2 (South Tower) is 1,362 feet tall. 3 WTC, the Vista Hotel, rises 265 feet above street level and contains 821 guest rooms. 4 WTC, also called the Southeast Plaza Building, rises nine stories, is 119 feet tall, and has 600,000 rentable square feet. 5 WTC, the Northeast Plaza Building, is nine stories, 119 feet tall, and has 700,000 square feet available for rental. 6 WTC is the NY/ NJ metro region consolidated Customs House and is eight stories, 130 feet tall, and contains 800,000 square feet of space. 7 WTC is 634 feet high and has 47 floors of office space. The complex has 256 elevators and 72 escalators. Some 60,000 people work in the WTC complex, and another 90,000 business and leisure visitors pass through the center each day. There are more than 450 firms and organizations represented, including trade and foreign government organizations engaged in such international commerce activity as import, export, freight forwarding, custom house brokerage, international banking and finance, insurance, and transportation. The WTC also is the Manhattan headquarters for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Page 22 The complex is served by several modes of mass transportation. The New York City Transit Authority provides direct subway service to the WTC by way of the IRT, BMT, and IND lines; bus service is available from several locations on surrounding streets. Port Authority Trans Hudson, or PATH, provides direct rail service with Hoboken, Jersey City, Harrison, and Newark, New Jersey. Ferry service also is available from Hoboken to the nearby World Financial Center. Page 23 Blast Damage by Steven C. De Rosa The effects of the blast on the World Trade Center were severe. PLAZA LEVEL (three levels above the explosion) A 100-square-foot section of concrete was cracked and lifted. CONCOURSE LEVEL (two levels above the explosion) A 400-square-foot hole was opened in a meeting/ dining room near the Liberty Ballroom of the Vista Hotel. Glass windows, the partition between the Vista Hotel and Tower at the concourse level, were blown out from the explosion, creating a pathway for heavy smoke migration from the Vista Hotel to Tower 1. A section of plaster-and-lath ceiling above the hole collapsed. B-1 LEVEL (one level above the explosion) A 5,000-square-foot hole was opened on the ramp leading to the parking garage below. The Port Authority command/ communications center was heavily damaged and rendered inoperable. Walls and ceilings were heavily damaged. Elevators were damaged. Seven steel columns were damaged and left without lateral support. B-2 LEVEL (ground zero) An L-shaped crater, approximately 130 by 150 feet at its maximum points, was opened, collapsing reinforced concrete and debris onto levels below. At least nine steel columns were heavily damaged and left without lateral support. Many walls collapsed, including a concrete block wall adjacent to the blast area that collapsed onto and killed five WTC personnel. Doors/ enclosure walls of Tower 1 elevator shafts were heavily damaged. Some 200 vehicles were fully or partially destroyed, and many were on fire. Primary electrical power feeder lines were damaged. Stairway doors and shaft walls were heavily damaged. Some standpipes were damaged. The sprinkler system in the immediate blast area was destroyed. Steven C De Rosa a 29-year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department, is deputy chief of Division 3 in midtown Manhattan, where he has served for 10 years He has developed numerous procedures for the department including high- rise tactics. Page 24 B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6 LEVELS (below the explosion) Debris from the blast traveled through a three-level architectural opening (spanning B 3 through B 5) and crashed down on refrigeration equipment on B 5. A ceiling of the PATH train station on the B-5 level collapsed. A 24-inch-diameter water supply pipe from the Hudson River to the air- conditioning chillers, as well as other smaller refrigeration/ air-conditioning and domestic water pipes, were ruptured. Domestic water lines to the emergency generators were damaged on the B-6 level. Page 25 The Materials Involved in the WTC Bomb by Frank L. Fire As reported in news accounts of the WTC bombing, it appears nitrourea was used as the bomb's base and cylinders of hydrogen were used to increase the magnitude of the a explosion. The following is a brief description of the materials involved. Nitrourea, a white, crystalline powder, is a Class A explosive. It also is known as m-nitrocarbamide, N-nitrocarbonide, 1-nitrourea, and N-nitrourea. It is a high explosive that presents a severe explosion hazard and is stable until detonated. Although some references say 2nitrourea is sensitive to heat and shock, the greater likelihood is that it is stable; otherwise, it might be too dangerous to transport by truck (or van). The power of nitrourea is similar to that of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and picric acid. (TNT and picric acid are used as reference points because TNT is referred to as the "standard' explosive in the United States and picric acid the "standard" explosive in Great Britain.) Nitrourea produces about 90.5 percent of the gas volume of TNT when detonated and has slightly more than three percent more relative power than TNT. It produces about 97.7 percent of the gas volume of picric acid and has three percent less relative power. Its caloric value (power as described by the number of joules of energy per kilogram of weight) is 34 percent greater than TNT's and 19 percent greater than picric acids. When compared with ammonium nitrate, nitrourea has about 13 percent less gas volume, about 38 percent more relative power, and about 47 percent more caloric value. Hydrogen is a highly flammable, nontoxic, colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas. Its flammable range is from four to 75 percent, the second widest range of any common flammable gas. With such a wide range, it is easily ignited. The flame from burning hydrogen has a very high heat content -its flame temperature is 3,700 OF. Hydrogen bums with an almost invisible flame, converting all energy into heat energy. Frank L. Fire is the vice president of marketing for Americhem Inc. in Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. He's an instructor of hazardous-materials chemistry at the University of Akron as well as an adjunct instructor of haz mats at the National Fire Academy. Fire is the author of The Common Sense Approach to Hazardous Materials and an accompanying study guide, Combustibilitv of Plastics, and Chemical Data Notebook A User's Manual, published by Fire Engineering Books. Page 26 Control of Elevator Operations by Steven C. De Rosa Many people were trapped in elevators when primary and secondary power was lost. World Trade Center staff stated that 45 occupied elevator cars were stuck, many in blind shafts. The damage to the WTC Command Center made it impossible to communicate with most of the stalled elevator cars, and the sheer size of the removal operation was initially overwhelming. Three agencies were involved in the removal operation -the fire department, Port Authority Police, and the city police department. Elevator maintenance personnel (who had offices in the WTC complex) played an important role in this removal process. Coordination of these operations proved difficult because it was difficult to determine the location of the elevators in the shafts. It took more than 11 hours to free the last trapped occupants. It is unlikely that most incident commanders will be confronted with extrication problems of this size-each tower had more than 99 elevators -but a significant high-rise fire may require actions including the following: Designate a sector elevator control officer and assign fire department personnel as needed. This officer will coordinate and supervise the extrication operations. When multiple agencies are involved, the fire department should maintain control by requesting radio-equipped agency representatives to work with the elevator control officer. Enlist the assistance of building engineers, elevator personnel, or maintenance personnel to determine the number of elevators and location status. Elevator cars stalled in blind shafts are difficult to locate without the help of the elevator control panel. Power loss will render most identification systems inoperable. A back-up battery-powered car identification system should be implemented. Work with officials of exempt government buildings to design fire protection systems that comply with local codes. The blind shafts in the WTC extended 78 stories. Firefighters had to open the shaft every five floors to locate a car - it was impossible to see more than six floors into Page 27 the blackness. Some local building codes require openings into blind elevator shafts at three-floor intervals; this feature was not provided in the case of the WTC. Elevator car extrication must be strictly controlled. Coordination and communication with building personnel are essential. Unanticipated emergency power restoration can result in severe injuries to rescuers and passengers. Building elevator personnel should be taken to each elevator machine room by fire department personnel. Once there, circuit breakers supplying power to the affected car should be opened to protect both the car occupants and rescue personnel. Brake releases for the elevators also are located in the machine rooms. If power is cut off and elevators are stuck, the brake is manually released. Then, if the load in the elevator is more than 5,000 pounds, the car will slowly drift down to the bottom. If the load is less, the car will drift up. Page 28 Command Analysis by Jack McCormack With any fire department operation, the organizational structure of command expands to meet the needs of the incident. Remember, it is not necessarily the size of the incident but its complexity that determines the command structure. At the inception of the WTC explosion, units arriving at the hotel directed their efforts toward the seat of the fire in the parking garage. Simultaneous with the aggressive direct attack, units were sent to operate in the hotel because of the smoke conditions reported there. As the assessment and size-up continued, the magnitude of the incident was realized. The command structure expanded to meet the complexity of the problem. The WTC explosion is a prime example of the reason command structures have the flexibility to expand in anticipation of complex developments. As the incident commander, Chief Anthony Fusco had to constantly assess the problem, develop strategic goals, and ensure that tactical objectives to accomplish those goals were achievable with available on-scene resources. Defining the problem requires feedback from all areas of the operation. After determining the parameters, the strategic goals can be formulated. It is the command structure that allows that feedback of information to assist the IC so the strategic goals can be established. The goals of each aspect of the operation must support the 16's strategic goals, and vice versa. Complex though the WTC explosion was, the command structure implemented by Chief Fusco provided control, supervision, and coordination. It likewise fixed accountability for specific tasks necessary to achieve the tactical objectives in each sector. Complex operations necessitate a tight span of control to ensure the safety of operating members. The division of command into manageable segments -sectoring-allows for adjustments to tactics. For example, as information was received regarding the extent of structural damage and the presence of the crater created by the explosion, an additional operations sector was created in the Jack McComack, a 25year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department, is a deputy assistant chief and deputy commander of the borough of Queens. He has worked all over Manhattan for 12 of those years, as deputy chief assigned to the 1st Division in lower Manhattan, executive officer to the chief of department, and as battalion chief. Page 29 below-grade area. Evaluations made close to the area of operations provided the sector command post and the IC with the information necessary to develop strategic goals. Achievement of multiple tactical tasks requires specific assignments and accountability to each subsector and sector. This provides the chain of command with the status of the operation: what has been achieved, what has not been achieved; what obstacles have been overcome; the resources committed, and where; and reserve status. The chief in charge of any operation, large or small, must maintain a broad focus and high visibility -likewise with chiefs responsible for sector commands. As a sector officer at the WTC incident, I was well aware of this. Each branch or sector operations command post requires a recognizable command post. Ideally, the command post should be free of encumbrances. This was not the case in the Vista lobby. Numerous units from various departments and agencies passed through the area. Control was difficult. The use of a unit status board was necessary to account for units operating, relieved, or staged and is essential at each operations post at multifront incidents. It provides a visual view of what the operating structure is and who has which area of responsibility. This board should be similar in format to the fire department communications unit's status board used by the IC. Adequate lighting is a must at a command post. When the command post is the lobby and the building's power is out, auxiliary sources of light must be provided as soon as possible. When a command post is staffed by a number of chief officers and chief aides, there is a need for adequate space to accommodate the number of personnel. Control of the command post is essential. Units reporting to a command post can overwhelm it. Unless direction is given to stage members away from the command post area and it is made clear that only officers report in, confusion and interruption of operations will occur. Page 30 First Response: Engine 6 Operations Below Grade by Timothy F. Dowling The tour at Engine 6 began in a typical fashion on February 26, 1993. No outside activities were scheduled, and the four on-duty firefighters regularly assigned to Engine 6 were performing maintenance tasks related to equipment, apparatus, and quarters. They had been with the department for from six to 12 years. Also in quarters was an off-duty Engine 6 firefighter who had completed the night tour and was talking on the pay phone to a friend who worked on one of the upper floors of the World Trade Center Complex. At about 1217 hours, the off- duty firefighter was told by his friend that the electrical power had failed at the WTC and that the building shook. The friend knew that Engine 6 would be responding. The firefighter hung up the receiver and shouted, "Get out. Something just happened at the World Trade Center!" When I slid down the pole to the apparatus floor. He told me what he knew and asked permission to respond with the unit. I granted permission and directed all members, including the off-duty firefighter to gear up a while I notified the Manhattan dispatcher that Engine 6 was heading to the WTC. At the same instant, the teleprinter alarm began to transmit the following: Fill out alarm -2nd source. EOO6 EO07 LO10 LOO1 BCOl. Box 0069 -West St. -640' south of Vesey St. Incident #181 02/ 26/ 93. 121852. The printout specified a location other than that normally given for the WTC. Engine 6 is the second-due engine at alarms for the WTC. The fire alarms transmitted for the WTC instruct the companies to respond to specific locations, according to the location of the reported incident. I directed the engine chauffeur to respond to the location given on the teleprinter printout. This was just the beginning of what was to be anything but a normal incident. En route, the department radio reported a possible electrical transformer explosion. Engine 6 arrived at the WTC within two minutes -traffic was unusually light. A tremendous volume of black and brown Timothy F. Dowling was a member of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department from 1962 until 1993, when he retired. He retired as a firefighter with Engines 324, 14, and 6; as a lieutenant with Engines 96 and 295; and as a captain of Division 3 and Engine 6. Page 31 smoke was pushing violently from the street vents and the garage entrance in front of the Vista Hotel. As we passed under the north pedestrian bridge, which connects the WTC with the financial center across West Street, members of the New York/ New Jersey Port Authority Police were exiting the B ramp from the B-2 level of the parking garage. They stopped us and said there had been an explosion on the B-2 level of the parking garage, people were trapped, and numerous fires were burning. They also said their knowledge of and experiences with the WTC complex indicated that "this was not an electrical transformer fire." I directed the chauffeur to take a nearby hydrant while I began an initial size- up. My primary concerns were the conditions, whether we were at the proper location for attacking the fires, the collapse potential in the area, and conducting a quick surface search for victims while we advanced on the fires. I directed members, including the chauffeur, down the B ramp for a primary search of the immediate area while I conducted my survey. They were about to enter the garage when an agent from the United States Secret Service told them there was an ammunition storage area on the B-2 level. The question now was, How involved were the munitions in this incident? The agent entered the B-2 level with Engine 6 and showed me the location of the storage area. Although we determined that the ammunition was not part of the fire, we still had to consider its presence when planning operations. The B-2 level was devastated. Dozens of cars were crushed, thrown about, and fully involved in fire. Walls and ceilings had collapsed. The piping containing electrical wiring was down. As the firefighters conducted their searches, I moved into the area of devastation. There was a heavy smoke condition and a red glow in the distance. As I continued my survey, I discovered that the sprinkler system had been destroyed. The extent and nature of the damage made it evident that someone had exploded a bomb on the B-2 level. Under normal conditions, we would use 2 l/ 2 inch hoselines from a standpipe system when operating in high-rise buildings. Two companies would work together to give the units six lengths of 2 l/ 2 inch hose on each line. Not today! Page 32 The number of cars burning, the large red glow in the distance, and all the rubble and debris present made it necessary to hand-stretch from the apparatus in the street. This line would supply a confirmed, continuous source of water. The volume of water in the stream would quickly knock down the car fires as the firefighters fought their way to the main target -the large, red glow in the distance. The reach of the stream would permit them the luxury of operating in the safest position they could find while still extinguishing the large body of fire awaiting them. Most importantly, the 2 l/ 2-inch hose-line was their link to the outside: It would guide them out or, in the worst-case scenario, lead responders to them if they became victims. Quickly returning to the B ramp, I ordered that a 2 l/ 2-inch hoseline be hand- stretched. The firefighters, meanwhile, had rescued two civilians from the collapsed rubble. Both were severely burned, had suffered lacerations, and were in shock. Shouting orders while on the run, I raced to the apparatus and transmitted the signal "10-45" (victims severely injured and/ or burned) on the department radio. The time was 1223 hours. While the chauffeur was running to the apparatus to begin hooking up to the hydrant, he saw EMS ambulances responding down West Street and quickly went into the roadway, stopped the ambulances, and requested assistance for the two burned victims. With EMS and the police treating the civilians, Engine 6 now was able to turn its full attention to the long hand-stretch. Reentering the garage dragging the uncharged handline, the firefighters began the struggle of stretching over the collapsed debris, under the downed pipes, and around collapsing walls. During this time, explosions were occurring all around them. It took a few moments to realize that the explosions were caused by burning car tires and were not secondary bomb explosions -at least they hoped it was car tires. During the stretching of the hose-line, a third victim suddenly appeared out of the flames and smoke, startling the firefighters for an instant. One of the firefighters moved quickly among the burning cars and under the downed pipes to grab the victim, who was heading toward the main fire. After turning the third victim over to EMS, the firefighters returned to continue with the hand-stretch of the hoseline. Page 33 ENGINE 7 ASSISTS Engine 7 arrived at the scene. The lieutenant observed Engine 6's stretching of the hoseline and directed his firefighters to assist. An employee of the New York Telephone Company and a member of the Syosset (NY) Volunteer Fire Department helped with the hand-stretch and then remained for many hours to help Engine 6's chauffeur. The additional help on the handline enabled Engine 6 to begin the attack on the fire. Engine 7 returned to the street and started a second 2 l/ 2-inch hoseline down the B ramp. I informed the firefighters that the car fires had to be knocked down as quickly and as safely as possible so that they could address the main target -the big red glow in the distance. Engine 7, in the meantime, would stretch a handline and operate to the right of Engine 6, where many more car fires were encountered. Engine 6 began its attack. With the firefighters spread out on the hose-line, the nozzleman opened the nozzle, bouncing the water off the interior roofs of the cars, breaking up the stream, and then shooting the water under the cars' hoods and at each wheel well. The fires were quickly extinguished. The nozzle then was shut down, making the line easier and safer to move in the debris while moving on to the next car. With the controlman and the doorman pulling hose while watching everyone and the surrounding area for hazards, Engine 6 repeated this operation again and again until the crew arrived at the main body of fire. Suddenly, another danger presented itself. The force of the explosion had crushed dozens of cars, rupturing their gas tanks, oil crank cases, and transmission and brake hoses; the floors became covered with gasoline and oil. We became aware of this problem when the nozzleman and the backup man, operating under a heavy smoke condition, began to slide down into a huge crater created by a collapsed portion of the garage floor that was at a 45-degree angle. Flames lapped at their legs, and everyone moved quickly. The doorman and controlman grabbed the backup man, while I grabbed the nozzleman. We almost became victims, however, as the oily floor made it necessary for us to struggle to maintain our footing. The backup man was rescued first. Working together, the crew got the nozzleman back on level ground. Moving back a short distance, Engine 6 regrouped, pulled the hoseline back, and repositioned themselves at another point on the edge of the bomb crater. Page 34 ARRIVAL AT THE PRIMARY FIRE We had reached our main target. The reach of the 2 l/ 2-inch hoseline now was brought into play. The bomb crater was huge, and a tremendous fire was burning. Our 45-minute SCBA air pack alarms began to ring. Our chauffeur appeared with spare cylinders. Concerned about our safety, he made repeated entries into the bomb area. Engine 7's officer and chauffeur were working as a team to monitor pumper operations. I was unable to contact the command post on the street level from our below- grade location. As senior officer at the location, I checked on the safety and progress of Engine 7 and the members of ladder 1, who were conducting primary searches of the burned cars. Moving around the area -climbing over, under, and around all the hazards and debris -was extremely dangerous, but the safety of the members was of paramount importance. MAIN GOALS: PROTECT AND EXTINGUISH Early in suppression operations, Firefighter Kevin Shea fell into the bomb crater. When this occurred, Engine 6 was the only unit with the necessary water pressure and volume operating into the bomb crater. Our primary focus, therefore, became the protection of Firefighter Shea and his rescuers in addition to the extinguishment objective. For the good part of an hour, Engine 6 firefighters worked to accomplish these goals, rotating positions on the handline numerous times in an effort to conserve as much strength as possible without jeopardizing safety and operations. As more units arrived on the scene and advanced toward the bomb crater, the crater fire began to darken down. Shea was removed from the hole, and the main body of fire was extinguished. Relief units arrived on the B-2 level after 1400 hours, and the first-alarm operating units were able to leave the area. As Engines 6 and 7 emerged up the B ramp after almost two hours on the B-2 level, their members confronted a scene that was unbelievable. The quantity of equipment and number of personnel on the scene were mind boggling. During operations, the members were so intently focused on extinguishing the many fires and protecting each other that they did not realize the beating they had taken: smoke inhalation, traumas from falling concrete, hitting downed pipes, and falling over collapsed debris. Engine Companies 6 and 7 were taken to St. Vincent's Hospital in Greenwich Village, where the hospital's disaster plans were in full operation. Page 35 LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED 1. For engine companies. the decision to apply water and knock down the fires, thereby reducing smoke development. played an important role in the outcome of the incident -just as important as locating victims in and removing them from the immediate blast area. 2. Companv commanders play an important role in relaying initial conditions of their "slice" of a major incident -in this case. for example, relaying information on the extent of the explosion to help the incident a commander establish the magnitude of the incident. 3. Although the 2 l/ 2-inch handline is more difficult to maneuver,, speed was not compromised due to the need to move slowly around the crater -leaking; vehicle fuels. water, and so on made the floor and surfaces verv slippery. threatening: to plunge members into the crater. The 2 l/ 2-inch hoseline placed greater physical demands on firefighters, but it provided the volume and reach needed for fire extinguishment and member protection. 4. Gather as much information from a varietv of sources as possible in making: size-up determinations and tactical decisions. Many factors entered into the decision to operate down the B ramp and hand- stretch our line, including information from the off-duty firefighter, the teleprinter, the department radio, Port Authority Police, and the Secret Service Agent, plus a number of on-scene tangibles and intangibles, including: -the visual inspection of the blast site; -the nonoperating sprinkler system; -achieving a positive, confirmed water supply: -the training and experience of members; -our ability to adapt and be flexible; -our members' awareness that they were operating in a very dangerous environment and that they had to be alert for worsening conditions; -confidence in the firefighters and their abilities and firefighters' confidence in the officers; -the importance of getting the first hoseline into operation; and -teamwork and communications between the first-arriving units that made it possible to get water on the fires more quickly. Page 36 5. Appropriate levels of safety and accountability must be achieved for every incident. PASS devices and good flashlights were mandatory during this operation. In a major operation, communications may be difficult, particularly from below grade, and it may take time to fill positions within the ICS in the initial stages of the incident. It is incumbent on senior company officers to assume a "global" responsibility for member safety during such situations. Page 37 Rapid Intervention at the Vista Hotel, Above Grade by John J. Walpole On Friday, February 26, 1993, at 12: 18 p. m., a powerful explosion took place on the B-2 level of the World Trade Center in New York. The New York Vista Hotel almost immediately became impassable due to the resulting thick black smoke, fallen walls and ceilings, blocked exit doors, and a totally uprooted garage floor with substantial damage from the plaza level down to the B-6 level. It became immediately evident that this was an extraordinary explosion -it seemed to be effective -everywhere at the same time. The service and guest elevators of the hotel were out of commission, with the service elevator walls in a collapsed condition. The walls of the laundry room on the B-l level collapsed, and pipes were hanging from the ceiling. The employee locker rooms, employee cafeteria, receiving area, garage and garage office, police station, operations office, and area leading to the loading dock all were destroyed. Visibility was close to zero within the B-l area. At the time of the explosion, I was waiting for an elevator with another individual on the B-l level. An invisible blast wave emanated from the elevator shaft, immediately followed by an onrush of air back into the elevator shaft. It was when the backrush of air occurred -not during the initial blast -that building materials and debris began to fall around us. Immediately following the explosion, I collected myself and also took charge of the ensuing chaotic situation. An immediate evacuation directive was radioed to the hotel fire command station in the lobby, where an assistant fire safety director was on duty as per the hotel's fire safety plan. With help from the assistant chief engineer and assistant director of safety and security, I conducted an evacuation of the B-l area. The 120 employees located within the area were directed by voice and light to the John J. Walpole is director of safety and security for Hilton International's Vista International Hotel, an 829-room, one-ballroom, three-restaurant hotel in the World Trade Center. His professional experience includes serving as assistant director of investigations for the New York Racing Association, as a special investigator with the Nassau County District Attorney's Office, and with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Walpole is a certified protection professional who has a bachelor's degree in criminal justice and has received various specialized training through the DEA and the New York City Police Department. Page 38 only exit that could be cleared for evacuation due to the extensive damage in the area. One employee was temporarily blinded by office glass that exploded in his face; another employee fell and suffered a leg injury. All were removed by security personnel to the safety of the street, where medical aid was available. Our emergency generator and public address system were still functional after the explosion, and the assistant fire safety director made forceful evacuation announcements to building occupants over the PA system. The emergency generator later was shut down because of concern that it was supplying damaged, energized electrical equipment in the below grade areas, potentially subjecting people to injury. In addition, the generator itself was in a damaged area that was subject to collapse. Security personnel used quick-response equipment located throughout the hotel, such as portable lights and tools, as directed in the fire safety plan. The smoke was so thick and black in places that using lights to guide personnel was ineffective at times. Individuals in the B-l area -both hotel employees and Port Authority personnel -were in a state of shock but evacuating in an orderly file. Concern was raised that another explosion would take place and that the already- damaged walls and ceilings could collapse further, causing additional damage and injury. After the B-l area was secured and no longer occupied, I proceeded to the lobby area to take charge of the fire command station and put in place additional search and rescue efforts by hotel security/ fire safety personnel. After reaching the lobby area of the hotel and assessing the damage, I realized that the hotel had suffered tremendously. [See digram of lobby level of Vista Hotel on the following page.] A meeting room (adjacent to the Liberty Room ballroom), directly over the point of explosion on the B-2 level, had a large hole in it. At the time of the explosion, guests and attendees in the ballroom areas were evacuated without incident or injury by the security/ fire safety personnel on duty in the area. The Plaza Level area, consisting of two restaurants and the executive offices for the hotel, was damaged. Security personnel searched the guest room and public facility areas of the hotel to evacuate and locate any possibly injured guests or employees. The entire evacuation took about 10 minutes, with minimal injury -a very professional job. The time of day (around the noon hour) helped in that the hotel was minimally occupied. After attending to the evacuation and head count of guests and employees, the hotel safety/ security and engineering staff, along with managerial personnel, began to assess the physical and structural damage to the hotel. At this time, emergency personnel were responding to the Page 39 Vista Hotel -Lobby/ Concourse 772-2-28-94-4 scene. Firefighters conducted their search operations. During the physical- damage assessment, it became evident that numerous resources had to be mobilized to protect the hotel and property. BASIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT All power for the hotel was knocked out. Telephone service was down. The building's heat plant was out. No water was available, so sprinkler and standpipe systems were not operational. The fire alarm system was inoperable. Building security was breached -i. e., doors had been blown off and were not functional. The structural integrity of several areas of the building was in question. RECOVERY EFFORTS Hotel engineering immediately arranged for consultative and contractual assistance to help correct the results of the blast. We then took the following steps: contacting mobile electrical generating facilities to arrange for a tie-in to the hotel's electrical system; Page 40 arranging for mobile steam-generating units and the appropriate tie-in to the hotel systems to safeguard against pipes freezing; contracting with all major trades (i. e.. electrical, plumbing, carpentry, steam-fitting, and cleaning) to deactivate any live wires, cap any services required, and provide temporary barricades and, enclosures from the elements, as necessary; contacting the fire alarm company to assess damage and reactivate the fire alarm system; hiring a private security firm to aid in the protection of hotel property and render fire watch assistance: contacting architectural and engineering consultants to examine the damages and provide a full assessment of immediate and long-term repairs; and providing all labor necessary to remove hazardous conditions -i. e., falling walls and ceilings and so forth, to render the site safe for further demolition and repair. The efforts of hotel personnel and on-site engineering contractors were successful in that all precautions were taken and engineering expertise was present for professional assessment. Although damage resulting from the explosion was critical, personal injury was minimal. The success of the hotel evacuation and recovery was due to professional engineering response professionals were on-site and immediately available. In addition, security and fire safety personnel had participated in collective training and planning. The hotel is scheduled to reopen in mid-1994. Page 41 Below-Grade Fire Extinguishment and Victim Recovery by Kenneth Cerreta I was relieved as incident commander of the World Trade Center explosion by Chief of Department Anthony Fusco approximately 30 minutes into the incident. He directed me to assume command of the fire extinguishment operation. Until that point, I had been concerned mostly with operations in the Vista Hotel and the thousands of people self-evacuating out of this giant complex in almost total darkness; smoke conditions in the stair towers and on the floors; and our rescue effort. Now I took leave of the command post, accessed the B stairs in Tower 1 to the B-2 level, and prepared to coordinate the firefighting actions below ground. The scene that greeted me can only be described as surrealistic. Heavy smoke poured out from a deep, wide crater and from burning debris and automobiles around it. I realized that the damage could only have been caused by a large explosive device. The thought of a second explosion crossed my mind but was quickly put aside by the urgency of the situation. Fire extinguishment at the WTC explosion was critical to the safety of the building occupants. There almost certainly would have been more injuries and deaths in this incident had members not halted the generation of smoke from numerous below-grade fires. Rescue and removal operations in the towers would have been much more difficult, and the occupants would have been exposed to greater amounts of smoke for longer periods of time. Handlines -all 2 l/ 2-inch lines, as per high-rise SOPS -were operated in the lower levels from the initial stages of the incident. Firefighters who manned these handlines did so under extremely dangerous conditions; the potential for secondary collapses or additional explosions was a constant threat. Kenneth Cerreta is deputy assistant chief of Manhattan Borough for the City of New York (NY) Fire Department. In his 30-year career, he has worked in all five boroughs of the city. He has a bachelor's degree in fire science from John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York and was an instructor of the fire department's incident command course. At the time of the World Trade Center explosion, he was commander of Manhattan South Fire Command. Page 42 Handlines Deployed in Fire Extinguishment 772-2-26-94-6 There were numerous fires on both the B-2 and B-3 levels. Members extinguished fires in offices, a cafeteria, locker rooms, workrooms, free-burning rubble, and at least 50 burning automobiles; lines also provided protection to Firefighter Kevin Shea, who had fallen into a crater and was vulnerable to numerous fires burning around him. As they advanced, firefighters on the attack lines searched for, and in some cases removed, victims from cars and under rubble. Size-up was hindered by poor visibility, the size of the crater and extent of the damage around it, and difficulty in communicating via portable radio. Lighting in the below-grade areas came from the fires themselves. Individual units on the B-2 level, in this very difficult environment, were unaware that there were other lines in operation near the crater. As the incident progressed, firefighters forced entry into automobiles and turned on their headlights for additional light. Fortunately, the area of the crater was so large that opposing streams were not a danger. I made my way around the periphery of the crater and personally communicated with units operating on the fires. Through these conversations and visual observation, I determined that the fires were being controlled by the surrounding handline attack. I relayed progress reports to the command post primarily through runners, though I delivered a few messages personally so as to confer with Chief Fusco. EXTINGUISHMENT SUMMARY Only four hydrants were readily available to initial-operating units, and portions of the buildings' standpipe systems were damaged in the blast. Nevertheless, water supply was never a serious problem because local fire companies had an excellent knowledge of the area hydrant system through preplanning, experience, and training. This was a critical factor in ensuring a rapid, continuous water supply, which, in retrospect, was our only real defense against smoke generation and, therefore, smoke movement within the buildings. Automatic sprinkler systems in the area around the explosion were either destroyed or overwhelmed by the blast; we worked with a Port Authority engineer to isolate damaged portions of both the sprinkler and standpipe systems so that undamaged sections would be functional if needed. Engine Company 10, observing smoke pushing from the Vista Hotel garage doors, entered the K-l stairs in the hotel and connected the first handline to a standpipe riser on the B-2 level. This did not produce a satisfactory stream - the standpipe was damaged and the resulting pressure Page 44 inadequate. Assisted by members of Engine Company 5, this hoseline was connected to Engine 10's apparatus in the street. Engine 10 operated this line for approximately two hours, extinguishing numerous car fires. Engine Company 6, arriving very soon after Engine 10, immediately connected to a hydrant and stretched a handline down the B garage ramp to the B-2 level, where the members rescued several victims, extinguished numerous car fires, and operated on the fires in the crater. Their water was supplemented from a manifold by Engine 5, whose crew members provided relief to Engine 6. Engine Company 7 assisted Engine 6 with their stretch, then stretched a handline of their own and operated on the fires in the crater and the automobiles. They also pulled a victim out of the crater debris. Engine Company 18 connected to a hydrant and supplied the standpipe system, partially operational, then stretched a handline off the standpipe on the east side of the crater. Engine Company 209 assisted in advancing this line and eventually relieved Engine 18. These units also removed a trapped civilian and assisted in the removal of Firefighter Shea. Engine Company 205 stretched from the standpipe on the B-3 level (south side of the crater). This handline was stretched and filled in with the assistance of engine companies 204,202, and 55. It was used to extinguish fires and protect Firefighter Shea during his removal. Engine Company 47 stretched and operated a line from Engine 7 down the Vista fire stairs to the B-2 level on the crater's southwest side. Engine Company 230 proceeded down the B stair in Tower 1 to the B-2 level. They stretched a line from the standpipe to the "building service area" and extinguished fires in an office and locker room area. This is the area from which four of the six fatalities were recovered. Engine Company 255 stretched and manned a line off a standpipe in the Vista Hotel and operated on the southwest side of the crater. Engine Company 54 stretched off the standpipe in the B-l stairs at the B-3 level and operated on the west side of the crater. Fourteen engine companies operated nine handlines to extinguish all below-grade tires in approximately one hour. The below-grade tires were declared under control at 1: 48 p. m. Page 45 VICTIM RECOVERY As the incident progressed, I was directed to coordinate the victim recovery operation in addition to fire extinguishment. Two fatalities (numbers two and three; the first fatality already had been located early in the incident by FDNY) were recovered from the building service area of Tower 1 during the initial search and extinguish-ment operations. This area is adjacent to where the explosives were detonated, separated by a concrete block wall. Once fires in this area were extinguished, we called for a PA supervisor to identity the bodies. He positively identified them, and they were moved to a temporary morgue set up in the Vista Hotel. The PA supervisor reported that three additional employees were thought to be in the general vicinity of the building service area at the time of the explosion. He provided us with names, descriptions, and last known locations, and we initiated a systematic search. Under the supervision of a battalion chief, units searched the rubble, starting from the area immediately surrounding the crater. It was a herculean task, considering that the rubble, piled two to three feet high, was a mass of broken concrete, twisted steel beams, mangled piping, and smashed wall board, lockers, and office furniture. A six-foot-wide strip around the crater was cleared by hand and searched, then the debris was moved back into this area and the search perimeter extended another six feet, and so on. Rotation and relief were imperative for this heavy manual work. Two fatalities, numbers four and five, were recovered by the fire department using this method. Another victim would be found approximately two weeks later; meanwhile, the search through the rubble had to continue until the entire area had been combed -there was always the possibility that a person not yet reported missing was visiting or passing through the area. LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED 1. The extinguishment of the fires on the B levels had a tremendous impact on the outcome of the incident. The fire extinguishment diminished the quantity of smoke generated and, as a result, diminished the amount of smoke traveling into the buildings above, without this relatively quick knockdown. The injury and death statistics would have been much different. Page 46 Officers easily can be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the evacuation effort at large-scale incidents, but always must remember a basic rule of firefighting: Timely handlines operated aggressively from the interior between the life hazard and the fire often are the best protection against the effects of fire. 2. Local fire units' knowledge of hydrant locations. building layout. and fixed svstems is an invaluable asset in high-rise/ industrial incidents. Time spent during building and hydrant inspections and local familiarization drills saves valuable time and effort when an incident occurs. 3. When normal fireground communication methods are ineffective. we must improvise by using; relays. runners, cellular phones. etc. 4. When operating at a large-scale oneration. members, including; incident/ sector commanders, may not alwavs be aware of the location of everv unit. It is important that each phase of the operation be under the control of chief officers who can network with the incident/ sector commander for a more complete picture. Be sure to call enough chiefs to the scene. 5. As soon as possible. ascertain the number of neople thought to be in the fire and/ or explosion area from supervisors. coworkers. or security personnel. Information including the names, descriptions, and last known locations can assist in pinpointing and organizing a systematic search. It will help speed up operations and, in turn, increase the chances of victim survival. 6. Risk analvsis is ongoing throughout any incident. but once fire is extinguished and those reported missing are accounted for, it becomes especially important to remove personnel on a timely basis if there is any doubt as to the stability of the involved areas. 7. Use large handlines for large bodies of fire. The maneuverability of smaller handlines was sacrificed for the quick knockdown capability of larger lines. This requires a Page 47 manpower-intensive effort. Relief, rotation, and crew augmentation must be considered -and practiced -by officers. 8. When exolosions take out a portion of a standpipe svstem, it often is possible to isolate the damaged section through the use of riser isolation valves and/ or sectional control valves. Preplan these operations so you know the valves' locations and the areas they control, and drill local units in their use. Page 48 Operations in Tower 1 by Donald J. Burns I was at FDNY Headquarters in the borough of Brooklyn when the World Trade Center (WTC) explosion occurred. I was notified of a second alarm at the WTC and that there had been some type of explosion. Usually, a report of an explosion in a high-rise indicates an electrical problem such as a large short or a transformer explosion. After notification of a rapid escalation to a third alarm, I responded with Deputy Chief Edward Dennehy. As we crossed the Brooklyn Bridge into lower Manhattan, a fourth alarm was transmitted, along with an additional alarm for Tower 1. The fire department radio traffic told me something big and unusual was taking place -this wasn't the "run-of-the-mill" high-rise fire. I approached the WTC and drove past the entrance ramp to the loading zone/ parking garage under the building. Smoke was issuing from the opening, and firefighters were removing people from the area and stretching lines into the lower levels. As I crossed West Street to the command post, I could see smoke drifting around and over Tower 1. I also could see people evacuating, tower windows being broken by the occupants, and a lot of confusion on the street. I reported to Deputy Assistant Chief Kenneth Cerreta at the command post, but I declined to assume the role of incident commander because I knew Chief of Department Anthony Fusco would be arriving soon and would be in command. I concentrated instead on Tower 1 and in finding solutions to the problems we had there. I was not prepared for the scene that greeted me when I entered the lobby: The smoke condition was so black and thick that visibility, even with a flashlight, was no more than three feet. The lobby was filled with people trying to evacuate. Fire, police, Port Authority, and EMS personnel had formed a human chain to funnel the people out of the stairway to the Donald J. Burns is a 32-year veteran and assistant chief of FDNY, currently sewing as the department's chief of operations. He has served as assistant chief of support services and as chief in midtown Manhattan. Burns developed and was the first director of the New York State First Line Supervisors Training Program. He is a New York state-certified instructor and has taught high-rise firefighting at the New York State Fire Academy in Montour Falls. Page 49 exit. Deputy Chief Dennehy and Battalion Chief Richard Picciotto were trying to establish a sub-command post near the entrance to gain control over responding units. After a quick reconnaissance of the lobby, I determined that I had to stop the smoke from being drawn into Tower 1, if possible. I took a company and went to the exposure #4 side, next to the Vista Hotel, where I knew there was a passageway connecting the tower and the hotel. I hoped that somebody hadn't closed the doors and that was the reason smoke was getting in. We soon found that not to be the case: The explosion had blown a hole through the floor in an area of the Vista Hotel adjoining Tower 1 and had blown out a number of large plateglass windows that were designed to act as a barrier between the two buildings. We would not be able to stop the movement of smoke. I knew that Tower 1, because of the stack effect, would act as a chimney for the fire down in the lower levels and that doors opening onto the stairway and smoke travel through elevator shafts would allow tenant spaces to become contaminated. On our way back to the entrance, one of our members suggested that we remove the front windows. Normally in a high-rise fire I wouldn't break out the windows, but in this case I felt that removing them would allow some fresh air into the lobby and stairways and might change the smoke patterns, keeping the smoke from being drawn into the tower, so I approved that action. I proceeded to the lobby command post and told the chiefs that the smoke could not be stopped and we would have to search the entire building -all 110 floors and 99 elevators. The explosion blew many elevator doors off their tracks and severed electrical cables, bringing all elevator service to a stop and trapping anyone in an elevator at that time. At this point, the people exiting from the stairway were choking from the smoke and complaining that there were no communications or lights. Reports from the evacuees indicated that smoke was heavy up to at least the 20th floor, possibly beyond that. We would have to rely primarily on firefighters to communicate with occupants. The WTC's central fire command station was located on the B-l level. The single control room had worked fairly well over the years, but when the blast knocked the control room out of service, the drawbacks of having only one control room for the entire complex were brought to the forefront. With the control room inoperative, communication between Page 50 command and the floors became impossible. The Port Authority's portable radio system could not be used, since it operated on a relay system that passed through the control room. The only communication with upper floors was via civilian radio or telephone system -or emergency workers. Telephones were a problem because those on a private telephone switching station operate on power from the building. I left the building and reported my findings to Chief FUSCO, now in command of the incident. I requested 30 to 40 units as soon as possible, then went to assume command of the Tower 1 sector. *** As I was leaving the command post, someone directed my attention to the walkway between the Tower 1 mezzanine and the Vista Hotel patio, specifically to a Tower 1 door located at that level. He said people were banging on the door and couldn't get it open. When the WTC was designed, I don't think anyone envisioned that someday 25,000 occupants would have to evacuate using only the stairways. Tower 1 was designed with only three evacuation stairways; only one of these runs the full length of the building to the lobby level. The other two stairways end at the mezzanine in the lobby of Tower 1, the exterior plaza level of the WTC. A walkway connects the Tower 1 mezzanine with the Vista Hotel's outside patio. Most occupants of the WTC had never entered the stairways before the incident; if the stairs were used, it was only for a floor or two. The stairs are not used as a regular means of egress. I ordered a truck company to the Tower 1 door leading to the walkway patio to force open the door. A tower ladder was parked nearby, and I ordered a member to raise the bucket up to the patio in case we needed it to assist evacuees. When the door was forced open, we found people piled up against it. Some were unconscious due to the smoke. They had come down the stairways that ended on the mezzanine level. Because of the heavy smoke, they couldn't find the exits after they got to the mezzanine. *** After the lobby windows were broken out, the smoke condition in the lobby and mezzanine improved considerably. It was then that I discovered some lights were still working. They stayed operational for only Page 51 a short time, until the emergency generators went out and, with them, the lighting. As companies reported in to Tower 1 sector command, they were given five-floor sectors to search and were directed to take a specific stairway to those floors so we could provide relatively uniform coverage to each of the three evacuation routes. The searching firefighters, as expected, had to force numerous doors both from the stairways and on the floors. I directed Battalion Chief Picciotto to assist at the command post in coordinating assignments. By the time our operation was in full swing, we had two deputies, each covering half of the tower; five battalion chiefs responsible for 20 floors; and approximately eight to 10 units operating per 20 floors. A representative from Port Authority engineering reported to the sector command post and informed me that he had a number of elevator mechanics available to climb the stairs to the machinery rooms on floors 48 and 74, where they could release the brakes on the cars and bring them up to the sky lobby to be checked. I detailed a truck company to accompany the elevator personnel to search the elevators. All units started from floor one and had to climb the stairs to whatever floors they had been assigned. At a rate of one minute per flight of stairs, it would take an hour to reach the 60th floor. But during such an emergency, with people using common stairways to evacuate, it really takes closer to two or three minutes per floor. We had to allow approximately two to three hours for a climb to the 60th floor. Chiefs on the stairs reported progress/ status and the conditions they found through a relay system my portable radio was good up to about 43 floors, so I stationed a deputy chief at that position to relay information from above down to me. I received periodic updates from messengers with MDT printouts of the calls from occupants of upper floors. I sent these messengers back to the command post with requests for additional units and progress reports. All afternoon, I was receiving reports of people trapped or in need of help. All these reports were investigated. People on the lower floors could be helped fairly easily, but it is very disheartening to get a message about people needing help because of a heart condition or disability when you know that nobody can reach them for a couple of hours. Nevertheless, emergency personnel accounted for all those who needed extra help. In some cases, nonambulatory civilians or civilians with health problems were carried down the stairs to ground level from upper floors. EMS (stair) Page 52 chairs and regular office chairs were used in many carries. Furthermore, late- arriving engine companies were requested to bring resuscitators to upper floors. *** The operation in Tower 1 was a massive search and evacuation effort. High-rise firefighting often calls for a defend-in-place strategy whereby occupants are sheltered in safe areas of the building while the fire is extinguished and essential building systems/ services are restored, if necessary. In this case, however, because occupants felt the explosion, followed a few minutes later by smoke throughout the building, almost everyone started to self-evacuate. The fire department made the decision to order a complete evacuation anyway, due to the nature of the incident and the unlikelihood that building electrical power and fire protection systems would become operational in a suitable period of time. Approximately four hours into the operation I stopped sending companies up the stairs, since companies already had made it to the 80th floor and could reach the top much faster than companies starting from the bottom. We already had more than 40 companies operating in Tower 1. At 1800 hours -the change of tour -the issue of relief arose. I decided not to relieve the units, instructing them to perform secondary searches on the way down. Some units had been in the building for more than eight hours by the time they got back to the street. As time went on, problems developed that are inevitable in any extended operation -flashlight batteries died, radio batteries started getting weak, firefighters were getting hungry, and exhaustion was setting in. We decided that as soon as members reached the lobby area, they would take up and go home. The firefighters who operated in Tower 1 accomplished remarkable things. Some climbed 110 floors to search. Some carried people down 60 or 80 floors. Members responded to about 20 maydays for people in serious trouble. They searched 99 elevators and, in the end, 25,000 people were evacuated. When I first went into the tower and saw the smoke condition, I expected to have a big problem -people collapsing and maybe even a few deaths. As time went on, conditions improved and, except for a few cases of exhaustion and chest pains that were quickly handled, the pressure on everyone lessened. Page 53 On that Friday, I believe anybody who responded went through a whole range of emotions, from fear of a large loss of life to anxiety, exhaustion, and, finally, exhilaration. It was an operation that few who were there will ever forget. Elevator and Stairway Configuration, Towers Page 54 LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED 1. With barriers between below grade areas and Tower 1 breached, stack effect in control. and the force of the explosion behind it. smoke migrated to upper floors throuph shafts within minutes. A crucial early action was the removal of the lobby windows, allowing some smoke to escape and that which remained inside the tower to be diluted. This "short- circuiting" made the evacuation route more clear and cut down on the quantity of smoke on the upper floors. 2. Without elevators. sending companies to upper floors in large high-rise building is measured in hours. not minutes. Chief officers must call for and coordinate resources accordingly. 3. There is no perfect building;. Having the two stairs discharge to the mezzanine lobby, rather than directly to the exterior, was a major building design flaw. With visibility at less than a few feet due to smoke, people could not find their way out once they reached the mezzanine. Exits must be continuous -safely leading people to a public way. 4. Rest and rehabilitation nav a critical role in operations that nlace great physical demands on firefighters. Early in the operation, doctors and nurses from the Port Authority health clinic in Tower 1 set up a space in the cafeteria on the 43rd floor for medical attention and rest and rehabilitation. This was used by civilians and emergency personnel and became an important area because it could supply soft drinks and food to those who needed them. 5. One of our biggest problems was communications. All building systems went down when the command center was knocked out. For operations involving very tall buildings or below grade areas, consider using a relay system for communications. Preplan and build contingency plans -our effectiveness is only as good as our ability to communicate. Page 55 6. Congested stairways made the use of stokes baskets for victim removal impractical. Fortunately, no victims required immobilization, so EMS chairs and office chairs were functional in transporting nonambulatory/ incapacitated civilians. In the future, it would be extremely beneficial to emergency personnel to have medical supplies, EMS chairs, resuscitators, etc. available at various locations throughout these large structures for possible use during an emergency. 7. Elevators represent both the primarv and secondarv means of egress for nonambulatorv/ incapacitated occupants of large high-rise buildings. Moving nonambulatory occupants down the stairways was a very difficult, manpower-intensive task. We were able to evacuate approximately 15 to 20 nonambulatory civilians from Tower 1, but what would have happened if we had to accommodate a 100 or more? Serious thought must be given to providing these individuals greater self-sufficiency in egressing large public buildings. 8. Sizes of the avenues of egress must be able to handle the occupant load. Evacuees were moving down the stairs as quickly as they could, but that was slow -like toll booths during rush hour in a big city. People from upper floors waited as long as an hour at certain points along the way while lower-floor occupants filed out. Not until 1630 hours did the steady stream of evacuees from the stairways lighten up. 9. Duplication of search efforts was a problem -among different emergencv agencies and the fire department itself. Greater attention to marking stairwell entrance doors to searched floors is important. 10. Entry into the building: by non-emergency personnel and members of private concerns (such as the media) must be controlled. This aspect was handled well by Port Authority Police located at building entrances. Page 56 Operations in Tower 2 by Robert Manson At 1218 hours on February 26, 1993, the occupants of the World Trade Center (WTC) Tower 2 knew immediately, from the concussion of the explosion, "that something had happened." Moments after the building shook, a light to moderate smoke condition began to develop on all floors, as smoke from the explosion and fires contaminated the tower through elevator shafts and other natural channels. Most of the approximately 25,000 tower occupants did what people do when they feel they may be trapped in a burning building: They tried to leave the building. Unfortunately, a number of people on that day either forgot about or ignored the elevator warning signs and entered the elevators in an attempt to escape. Within a very few minutes of the first signs of smoke, Tower 2 had a partial power failure -elevators and emergency communication and ventilation systems went down, and portions of the building lost lighting. The occupants who had made it into the elevators were trapped; some would be trapped in those prisons for as long as 11 hours. While there was confinement, terror, and discomfort within these elevators, there fortunately were no serious injuries or fatalities. Had there been a working fire on a lower floor in Tower 2, the death toll may have been in the hundreds. I was working a day tour in the 12th Division (borough of Brooklyn) on the day of the explosion. The 12th Division was directed by Brooklyn Communications to respond to the WTC complex, Tower 2, at approximately 1250 hours. The enormity of the event was immediately evident on arrival. >From every point of view, hundreds of people were either lying on the ground, sitting on sidewalks, or wandering around in a state of confusion. Too numerous to count were New York City EMS, police, and fire vehicles throughout the streets. Many of the lobby windows of Tower 2 had been broken out by firefighters, and a light smoke condition existed throughout the large lobby area. Numerous people were lying on the lobby floor, some were being treated by EMS personnel, some by other civilians, while others were still unattended. Hundreds of people in various states of Robert Manson is a 33-year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department, currently serving as a deputy chief of the 12th Division, in the borough of Brooklyn. From 1984-1991, he served as a staff chief, and his assignments included Manhattan borough commander and chief of fire prevention, before returning to the rank he now holds. Page 57 trauma were exiting the stairways, streetlight was the only light for the lobby area, adding to the eeriness of the scene. The only good sensed or felt on arrival was that whatever had caused all of this havoc was over with -it had done its damage. In Tower 2, there was fire to control, and the smoke condition on upper floors improved dramatically as below- grade fires there extinguished about an hour into the operation. Locating, treating, and removing the injured and trapped victims constituted the incident. Deputy Chief Joseph Mills of the 11th Division also was assigned to Tower 2. Chief Mills asked me to issue the lobby command position in Tower 2 while he operated on the upper floors as the operations chief. The most immediate problem was treating the unattended civilians in the lobby area. Horizontal ventilation of the lobby early in the operation relieved conditions considerably, producing a very workable area for triage and treatment for those who had self evacuated to the lobby. With the arrival of additional EMS personnel, this was soon effected. We also were receiving reports that numerous people on various floors were suffering possible heart and asthma attacks and that at least two women were in labor, one of them reported to be hemorrhaging on the 98th floor. This woman was brought to the roof and removed by a NYPD helicopter. I contacted the ranking EMS officer in the lobby and asked him to establish a triage center on the 34th floor. The 34th floor was chosen because one of our fire units reported it to be an open floor with good outside lighting. A male occupant fell while descending the stairs on the 68th floor and broke his leg. He first was carried to and treated at triage and then chair carried to the lobby for removal to the hospital. A fire unit also reported that more than a hundred civilians, many of them young children, were on the 107th-floor observation deck. Having been previously informed that electricity for the elevators might not be restored for a number of hours, if not days, the units were instructed to remove the civilians by stairway. During the removal, which took more than two hours, additional fire personnel were stationed throughout the stairwell to provide lighting and support to the children evacuating. The number and configuration of stairways in Tower 2 were essentially the same as those in Tower 1: There were three stairways, one of which traveled the length of the building and two of which terminated Page 58 (or began) at the mezzanine level. But, unlike Tower 1, the smoke condition in Tower 2 was not so severe that occupants could not find exterior doors once they reached the mezzanine level. SEARCH AND REMOVAL The major problem for search and removal in Tower 2 during this incident was the trapped elevator occupants. There were 99 elevator cars in the tower; almost two-thirds of them traveled through blind shafts. All the elevators had to be searched, and there were no elevators located at the lobby when power went down. One of the FDNY members performing search and evacuation of the elevators in Tower 2 was Lieutenant James Sherwood, an off-duty firefighter who had volunteered his services. While performing this duty, he became aware of an occupied elevator within a blind shaft on the 42nd floor, at approximately 1730 hours. He searched around the core of the building at each floor, tapping on the walls and calling out for a possible response. When he received a response on the 42nd floor, he informed the "voice" that he would soon have him out. The lieutenant asked how many were in the elevator. The response was 72, most of them schoolchildren ages five and six Having carried a maul during his search, the lieutenant was able to breach a small hole in the wall and to see a small portion of the top of the elevator car. He could make out the forms of numerous people in the car. He passed his flashlight into the car and then widened the hole so that he could enter the shaft onto the top of the elevator car. When on the car, he realized he was next to an open adjacent shaftway -if he fell, it would be a 42-story fall. He opened the elevator car's hatchway, reached down, and began to pull children up one by one. He passed the children to Port Authority police officers, who now were on the other side of the wall. After 12 of the children had been removed, the elevator car began to slowly descend without notice; power to one elevator bank was restored, and elevator personnel were bringing down the car. The lieutenant climbed into the elevator car to calm the now very fearful occupants. After a number of panic-filled minutes, the elevator car reached the lobby, and the occupants finally were removed to awaiting EMS personnel. The lieutenant has been recommended to the NYC Fire Department's Board of Merit for a commendation. During the entire operation in Tower 2, FDNY operated with several battalion chiefs and 27 companies. While the search-and-rescue challenges in Tower 2 were indeed significant and sizable, fewer firefighters where required for this tower, as compared with Tower 1, because, as noted, the smoke condition in Tower 2 did not present an urgent, Page 59 life-threatening situation. At 1800 hours with the change of tour, seven fresh truck companies were special-called to relieve the day-tour units. These units were special-called for a relief, to continue initial search and evacuation, and to perform a secondary search of all floors. With power restored to some of the elevators at approximately 1800 hours, we were able to send fresh units to the 50th floor by elevator. We also were able to procure master floor/ office keys for entry into locked offices. The remainder of the search, while exhausting, went relatively smoothly. The last elevator occupants were found and removed at approximately 2300 hours, almost 11 hours after the beginning of the incident. LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED 1. At any high-rise incident. once occupants begin to self-evacuate. it is almost impossible to stop them without good communication to the floors and stairways. Occupants terrified for their lives will not readily listen to instructions to stop their exiting -which they truly believe will save their lives. Even if reversing self-evacuation were possible, fire department assessment of the extent of damage to vital building systems and the probability or improbability of restoring services within a reasonable time must factor into the decision. Unless absolutely necessary to protect life, it is advisable to assist (emergency personnel presence) in this self-evacuation to alleviate panic and to remove occupants from the stairways and building as soon as possible. Once building occupants reach the lobby, the noise from these occupants will interfere with the incident management. (For those who make it down safely, extreme tension easily gives way to an almost festive mood.) In large-lobby buildings, remove the occupants to a distant part of the lobby, away from the lobby command post. In smaller-lobby buildings, remove the occupants to the outside if breaking glass and weather are not issues of concern. 2. At all high-rise incidents involving evacuations. the incident commander and sector officers must maintain stairway control, using them to the fullest advantage. There was no fire in the towers at this incident, so designating "attack stairs" and "search-and-evacuation stairs" was not necessary; however, command directed companies to specific stairways to provide maximum coverage during the search effort and, based on communications with upper-floor officers, to address particular rescue problems in the most Page 60 expedient manner. Personnel resources must be such that sectoring of officers achieves stairway control. 3. Common sense dictates that when units are Special-called to high-rise buildings for search and evacuation under nonfire conditions (relief units at this incident). they should be advised in quarters. via command order through dispatch. to respond with street shoes. A 30-, 60-, or 90-story climb will tax even the best-conditioned firefighters, and reducing the weight carried by firefighters will cut down on injuries and enhance the operation. Seven-pound boots translate to 35 pounds of "back weight." 4. As in any fire operation, a secondary search of all areas of the building must be made by fresh units to ensure that all occupants have been found, treated if necessary, and then removed from the building;. When possible, these units should be provided with master keys to facilitate this secondary search, if these keys were not made available to the initial unit( s). 5. The natural chaos at an incident of this magnitude will work against an incident commander's ability to plan ahead for potential problems involving personnel from other agencies. Every effort must be made to communicate with other agencies personnel and coordinate actions. The rescuer-accountability challenges are also magnified; with search parameters so large, it is imperative that company officers achieve control at the company level and communicate developments as often as necessary through a well-defined communications relay system. 6. Tools are an important aspect of search-and-rescue effectiveness. Firefighters must have the necessary tools before ascending the stairs-the 50th floor is not the place to remember the hydraulic door opener. Doors and elevators had to be forced, walls had to be breached, etc. 7. Assess medical needs early in the incident. Establish a forward triage area, if possible, which will allow for a prioritized patient-assessment and removal process. Page 61 8. Rescuing people through an elevator cab roof is performed only under extraordinary circumstances, such as those of the WTC incident. If power is restored to a stalled elevator involved in such an evacuation, such as that which occurred during the evacuation of the cabful of schoolchildren, rescuers and trapped occupants are placed in an extremely dangerous position. All elevator cabs have an "on top of car inspection switch" as well as an emergency stop button on top of the car, which will keep the cab from moving if power is restored. These switches/ buttons should be activated if rescues are conducted through the top of the cab. Activation of these switches/ buttons will not, however, prevent a cab from being moved manually from the elevator machine room. Page 62 Search and Rescue: An Overview by Ray Downey Within minutes of the initial explosion and resulting fire, rescues had begun. Port Authority personnel, including police officers at the command center on the B-l level and maintenance personnel who had been having lunch on the B-2 level, received a major blast impact. A number of victims had to be removed from beneath the rubble by their fellow employees. Firefighters arrived on the scene within minutes. By the time handlines were positioned and advanced toward the below-grade fires, rescues were taking place. As firefighters made their way down into the garage area, they were finding victims trapped under rubble piles, while other victims could be heard hollering for help. Although six people lost their lives, the potential for a much greater catastrophe was diminished by the heroic efforts of those involved in the rescue and suppression operations. Self-evacuation of the towers had begun minutes after the explosion. Occupants of the upper floors reported at smoke entered their office spaces minutes after they felt the effects of the initial blast. The fire department command structure implemented for this operation provided for, in addition to the main command post, individual sector and subsector commands within the primary areas that required immediate search and rescue. The sector command posts were located in the Vista Hotel, Tower 1, and Tower 2. Subsector command was established at the lower levels for fire extinguishment and the rescue of Firefighter Kevin Shea. Vista Hotel. All 829 rooms in the hotel had to be searched. After hearing and feeling the explosion, a number of occupants surprisingly remained in their rooms. Many others were found in the hallways and stairways and had to be assisted to safe locations. In addition, where master keys were not available, firefighters had to force numerous doors. Tower 1. In Tower 1, where the smoke condition was the heaviest, those conducting a massive search and rescue operation were encountering a multitude of problems that had the potential for disastrous results. Ray Downey, a captain and 31-year veteran of the City of New York (NY) Fire Department, has commanded the operations of its Rescue Co. 2 for the past 13 years. He is a member of FEMA's US& R working group for equipment, Advisory Committee, and Technical Review Panel. Downey has an associate's degree in fire science and is a New York stat